Breaking News -- Leaked Memo from al-Maliki's Security Adviser

Following is the text of a Nov. 8 memorandum prepared for cabinet-level officials by Muwafaq al-Rubaie, the Iraq national security adviser, and his aides on the National Security Council. The four-paragraph document, classified secret, was read and transcribed by Freedom from Blog.

We returned from the United States convinced we need to determine if President Bush is both willing and able to rise above the partisan agendas being promoted by others. Do we and President Bush share the same vision for Iraq? If so, is he able to curb those who seek American hegemony or the reassertion of colonial power? The answers to these questions are key in determining whether we have the right strategy in Iraq.

Bush reiterated a vision of Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish partnership, and in my one-on-one meeting with him, he impressed me as a leader who wanted to be strong but was having difficulty figuring out how to do so. Bush pointed to incidents, such as the use of American forces in the Sunni triangle, to demonstrate his even hand. Perhaps because he is frustrated over his limited ability to protect American forces against terrorists and insurgents, Bush has been trying to show strength by standing up to the Iraqi government. Hence the public spats with us over benchmarks and the Sadr City roadblocks.

Despite Bush’s reassuring words, repeated reports from our commanders on the ground contributed to our concerns about Bush’s administration. Reports of nondelivery of services to US areas such as New Orleans, intervention by the president’s office to stop military action against Iraqi targets and to encourage them against Iranian ones, removal of America’s most effective commanders on a partisan political basis and efforts to ensure American puppets in all ministries in Iraq — when combined with the escalation of Marine's (JARHEADS) [the American name for the Marines] killings — all suggest a campaign to consolidate American power in Baghdad.

While there does seem to be an aggressive push to consolidate American power and influence, it is less clear whether Bush is a witting participant. The information he receives is undoubtedly skewed by his small circle of Neocon advisers, coloring his actions and interpretation of reality. His intentions seem good when he talks with Iraqis, and sensitive reporting suggests he is trying to stand up to the al Qaeda hierarchy and force positive change with the Iraq Study Group. But the reality on the streets of Baghdad suggests Bush is either ignorant of what is going on, misrepresenting his intentions, or that his capabilities are not sufficient to turn his good intentions into positive action and outcomes.