Consultants

Frances posts on the story that John Edwards really wanted to vote against the Iraq war but that his consultants told him that that would not be a wise move, politically. Here's my take on this . . . .

Many, many people think that they can manipulate events, strategize, game the system, say the right words at the right moment and carry the day. And sometimes, one can. But not usually. Because the world is complex. One can only see so much of it, and one's vision is almost useless looking forward. (Hindsight may be 20/20, but foresight?) Actions almost always have unanticipated consequences. Moreover, things change--one's preferences, one's feelings, the feelings and attitudes of others. Things happen in the world. So words and positioning only get one so far. This is all too abstract . . . need a concrete example . . . .

Take the Iraq war vote in October 2002. Now, no one in October 2002 could have known what would happen if the United States invaded Iraq, and this goes for both those of us who were more or less right--like me--and folks who were disastrously wrong--like Darth Cheney and El Presidente. Now, a strategic politician in that position can try to guess where the war and public opinion on it will be in, say, two years, four years, and position herself correctly. That's what one pays consultants to help one do--although, all too often, the consultants take over and are no longer advising but running the show, by threatening dire consequences if their advise is not followed. But my point is that no one can ever know how a war is going to turn out, know with any certainty. There are so many variables--variables that the current administration seems to just be dealing with.

Instead of trying to predict the (politics of the) future, a politician might decide whether, in any given situation, the proposed policy is "right." Now, that will require taking into consideration the possible consequences of the policy, which are, again, difficult to predict. But to return to the war vote . . . when the policy on the table is the invasion of a country that is, at best, and I'm exaggerating, a marginal future threat to the United States, and one believes, in one's own mind, that that is the wrong choice (I'm looking at you, Edwards) . . . don't throw the conscience away so quickly.

Here's the political advantage of what I'm suggesting (which is, simply, to do what you think is right and let the chips fall where they may). One can always explain a vote, even one shown, in retrospect, to have been short-sighted, as having been motivated by conscience. "It was a matter of principle."

But it's very, very hard to explain a vote based not on principle but on trying to game the future. You know who I mean.