Walking through a Mansfield
Since I've spent the last several weeks grading, I missed commenting on an extraordinary piece of pop political theory written by Harvard's Harvey Mansfield and printed in the Wall Street Journal. Glenn Greenwald has analyzed its tortured view of law here, but I think something also needs to be said about Mansfield's rather odd reading of the history of political thought. As the best known living Straussian, and arguably America's most prominent academic conservative (Samuel Huntington notwithstanding), Mansfield's arguments will be taken seriously in many quarters. His thesis:
Though I want to defend the strong executive, I mainly intend to step back from that defense to show why the debate between the strong executive and its adversary, the rule of law, is necessary, good and--under the Constitution--never-ending.
A pretty wild claim. Mansfield sets out to prove that the American founders--all appearances to the contrary--set out to create an executive who lived above the law, was not bound by either constitution or statute, and embodied the characteristics of Machiavelli's Prince as filtered through the English monarchy. He concedes that rule of law should sometimes win, but only in "quiet times," apparently "quiet" as defined by the executive himself. Remarkably, this argument repeats almost verbatim the most famous claims of Nazi legal theorist Carl Schmitt, whose The Concept of the Political was critiqued almost immediately upon its arrival in 1932 by Leo Strauss. In some ways, Mansfield seems to be undoing that critical distance between Strauss and Schmitt, an interesting development in its own right.
It is true, as I've noted before, that the American founders were indirectly influenced by Machiavelli. Not, however, by The Prince. The real link is to his Discourses, which celebrates the people (as smarter than the prince), the rule of law, the freedoms of speech, and an armed citizenry over specialized mercenary forces. These ideas, filtered through Algernon Sidney and Cato's Letters, created a strong presumption against monarchy, as both Sidney and Cato scorned any presumptions of executive privilege when confronted with the force of law, the authority of the legislature, and the power of the public. It is true, as Mansfield points out, that John Locke defended the executive's "prerogative" power, thus allowing him more discretion than either Sidney or Cato had. But in Mansfield's telling, Locke ("a careful writer") is a closet monarchist who sought to end the English Civil War by letting the absolute king win while making everyone think the legislative power had won.
Note to Straussians: stop using the doctrine of "esoteric teaching" as an invitation to bizarre acts of wingnut wish-fulfillment. Strauss was at least consistent enough to dismiss Locke as overly modern and "liberal." Reading Locke, as Mansfield does, as a more crafty Filmerite, does such violence to his text and to the history of his life and choices that it cannot withstand the laugh test. Locke was so radical that he had to flee to Holland for years, returning to England only when parliament had deposed the Stuarts and replaced them with its preferred royals, William and Mary. If Mansfield wants to use Locke as his prototype for an executive-centered political theory, I certainly hope he won't object when Congress ("the supreme power") commands the army to arrest George W. Bush, send him to Gitmo, and replace him with Al Gore. Locke's grants of prerogative primarily involve softening of the law (pardons), executive efficiency at moments when parliament is not in session, and foreign policy. But Locke always makes it very clear that the executive is bound by natural law and that final say in these matters is legislative. He constantly warns against giving executives too much power. Especially if you like them personally. Good princes, he says, will be followed by bad, and when they abuse their powers, you'll regret having given them a loose leash.
I won't document all of Mansfield's interpretive atrocities. He does a similar inversion on Aristotle, suggesting that Aristotle was really defending the "rule of man" against the "rule of law." What, might we ask, is the larger point of his argument? Apparently, that George Bush is a great leader, "a strong president" like Lincoln or FDR (stop laughing and go read the piece, I'm not making this up!) who is acting in our best interest even if we're too stupid to know it. Because republican (little-R) government means never having to listen to the people. Unless, of course, they're fearfully demanding an end to civil liberties in opposition to intransigent judges and legislators. Then the majority should rule. Finally, Mansfield ends by telling us we need more imperialism, not less. How about just smarter? I'd settle for that.
7 Comments:
All other values give way before loyalty to the conservative movement and its president, GWB. Therefore, rule of law--out, if the conservatives' annointed one demands it.
The cult of personality that has been constructed around the current president is truly shocking. It is at its most shocking(ness) when (formerly) respected scholars like Mansfield feel obliged to defend the indefensible.
Two of the things that I find intuitively attractive about conservatism are that it claims to see politics as a species of moral reasoning and, in that cause, elevates virtue and leadership to positions of prominence to which liberals, preoccupied by "interests" and "rights" tend to be oblivious.
The problem is that, the accumulated evidence (from the New Deal to civil rights to Iraq) suggests that conservatives couldn't recognize either moral virtue or statesmanship if it bit them in the collective ass. They're suckers for every petty tyrant and buffoonish charlatan who feins a big daddy demeanor. It's all really quite sad and pathetic, and I guess every generation has to experience the consequences of that confusion anew.
I think that part of the problem is the vast (and widening) gulf between the intellectual discourse of "thoughtful" conservatives and the beliefs and folkways of actual rank-and-file conservatives. The latter tend to be knee-jerk reactionaries with exceedingly small-minded views of the world (demarcated by class, race, ethnicity, and nation). They understand politics as an "us vs. them" situation (Schmitt). The "thoughtful" conservative critique of liberalism may have some value, but only as a corrective to liberalism--it's not a stand-alone or substitute for it.
OK, I have to go read this piece.
Locke a closet monarchist?!!!
The founders wanting an executive above the law?!!!
Are we in opposite land?
He has to be fucking kidding. Have we reached a point within American political discourse in which one can simply make any assertion one wants and then point to a text - as if the pointing is itself some form of justification?
I've never heard anything so ridiculous as what Tmcd calls out here.
Fronesis, I'll be curious to see what your take is once you read Mansfield's essay. It really struck me as the worst kind of Straussian reading, one where you can just project what you want to believe onto a thinker and then claim that the fact that everything LOOKS the opposite is in fact EVIDENCE for the Bizzaro interpretation.
One more point on the relationship b/w Strauss and Mansfield. One of Strauss's main criticisms of modern political thought, starting with Machiavelli, is that it begins with the "exceptional" situation (i.e., violence and anarchy in, say, a "state of nature") rather than starting from the "normal" or "healthy". As a result, Strauss claims that modern thought has become ill-prepared to defend to normal against the extreme since it has made that extreme itself the norm. This is a major part of LS's argument for blaming totalitarinism (and Nazism in particular) on hidden assumptions in seemingly "liberal" modern thought.
Mansfield, however, seems to have done exactly what Strauss warned against. I'm not necessarily persuaded by Strauss here, at least not if we're talking globally about "modern" pol. philosophy. But HM seems to offer a concrete example of how this flawed reasoning plays out.
That last comment makes a great point.
Post a Comment
<< Home